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The crash of '87 
The crash 
Alan Freeman 
The Great Crash of 1929 is the only 
event in living memory which compares 
in scale with 29 October 1987, and 
Marxism the only theory which warned 
it could happen again. We obviously 
owe our doctrine a small pat on the 
back. 
Unfortunately this isn't enough. 
Why was the particular crisis of 1929 so 
sharp? And why was the depression 
which followed so long and so deep? 
The rediscovery of long waves in 
capitalism offers part of die answer.1 
The Keynesian economist Kindle-
berger2 offers another, not necessarily 
contradictory answer. He points to a 
structural imbalance in international rela-
tions in the inter-war period, marked 
by Britain's fall from world leadership 
and the USA's rise to die status of 
hegemonic leader of world imperialism. 
As a theory of what caused die crash, 
abstracted from the contradictions of a 
system based on private investment for 
profit - as analysed by classical Marx-
ism - this does not stand up. What 
caused all the other recessions? But if 
seen, not as the cause of the crisis but 
as its highest expression - and die key 
to its solution - it is consistent both 
with classical Marxism and with its ex-
tension to include long waves. 
The central idea of Lenin's Imperi-
alism is that under monopoly capital, 
competition at die highest level is 
C4C/34-C 
between blocs of capital for the division 
of the world's markets, combined with 
the struggle for the division and redivision 
of the world's territory. 
Trotsky held that the resolution of 
global crisis demands a violent reorgan-
isation of relations between national 
states, serving as instruments for de-
fending national blocs of capital in 
international competition. 
These accounts are relevant today. 
What was World War II if not a con-
vulsive redivision of die world's 
markets and territories arising from a 
violent reorganisation of relations 
between states? What provoked it if 
not the radical imbalance between die 
world distribution of productive forces 
and the world relations between na-
tional blocs of capital provoked by 
Britain's decline and die USA's rise? 
More chillingly, what do we see now if 
not a new radical imbalance provoked 
by the long-term decline in die pro-
ductive capacities of the USA? 
This suggests that focussing on re-
lations between die great imperialist 
powers could shed great light on the 
1987 crash. 
Economic paralysis, political 
convulsion 
1929 was not a 'normal' cyclic crisis. 
By 1932, industrial production in die 
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34 USA was barely half its 1929 level. The 
US share index fell from a peak of 216 
to a trough of 34 - nearly 85% over 
three years. Trade declined for five 
successive years and did not regain 
1929 levels until after the war. It took 
five years for die first major country -
Britain - to reach its 1929 levels of 
production.3 The US saw no less than 
seven years of net negative investment.4 
But the political consequences were 
even more shattering. By die end of die 
recession Hider was in power, die 
Roosevelt administration was in office, 
the British Labour Party had collapsed 
into coalition, and France had seen 
four governments in as many years. 
Spain was in die diroes of civil war. 
There were an estimated fifty revolu-
tions in Latin America; Italy had con-
quered Abyssinia, the Japanese Man-
churia, and Germany was well ad-
vanced in die conquest of its Eastern 
neighbours. 
A chastening point for die view that 
the economic collapse of capitalism will 
burst open die door to socialism; during 
this enure period, in not one country 
was capitalism overthrown. 
The character of British world 
domination 
These convulsive changes revolved 
around a central pivot: die erosion of 
British hegemony. The notion of hege-
monic leadership is not a simple one, 
and does not reduce to being die biggest 
or most powerful. Britain until 1913, 
like die us from 1945 until around 
1971, combined a number of distinct 
functions. 
It was first of all die world's banker. 
It issued a reserve currency with un-
limited convertibility into gold which 
was die almost universal instrument 
for world trade and payment. As such 
it was die guarantor of die credit system 
on a world scale. On this depended not 
just world trade but imperialist ac-
cumulation, which required die large 
sums of loan capital which only die 
credit system could mobilise. 
Britain in effect operated a world 
counter-cyclical policy. Arthur Hen-
derson, in his proposal to die 1932 
Lausanne conference, recalled diat 
Britain used to maintain solvency 
everywhere in difficult times by 
shipping gold to centres of financial 
crisis and by drawing gold from centres 
not affected. 'It is of the essence of die 
present world difficulties diat London 
has failed in die discharge of diat vital 
function, and diat no other centre has 
been willing and able to discharge it', 
he concluded.5 
But Britain rose to world banker as 
its greatest producer, trader and 
shipper, and bestrode it as a capital 
exporter. At its zenitii in 1913 fully 82 
per cent of all capital issues in die UK 
were for foreign investment.6 Magdoff7 
cites the following estimates: 
Percent of total foreign investment 
UK 
Germany 
us 
1913 
50.3 
17.3 
6.3 
1930 
43.8 
2.6 
35.3 
I960 
24.5 
1.1 
59.1 
Capital export has proved die long-
est surviving component of Britain's 
imperial role, and die entire 20di cen-
tury is virtually a history of Britain's 
obstinate refusal to abandon it. On a 
superficial comparison die USA over-
took die UK as a capital exporter in 
1918. Between 1924 and 1929 us loans 
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abroad totalled $6,429 and those of the 
UK $3,301.8 Gross loans, however, 
probably do not clearly indicate the 
size of the disposable surplus for invest-
ment abroad mobilised by each coun-
try, since part of the loan activity of 
any country is to recycle funds it has 
attracted as a borrower. The Economist 
of 2 June 1928 tried to establish the net 
export of capital from each country, 
with the following results: 
Import (—) or export (+) of capital 
from US and UK 
US UK 
1922 263 681 
1923 -112 669 
1924 306 390 
1925 493 261 
1926 163 - 34 
1927 671 466 
1,784 2,463 
It concluded that: 
'The great fact of recent years is not 
that American capital, unable to find a 
use at home, is inundating foreign 
countries, but that the outflow. . . 
equals and even appreciably exceeds 
the inflow of capital from foreign 
countries which was stopped by the 
war but has now revived in very 
considerable volume. The fact is that 
America's trade balance shows no sign 
of producing a very large export 
surplus the proceeds of which she can 
lend abroad. She can only swell her 
foreign issues by lending money that is 
lent to her or by shipping gold.' 
In a nutshell this explains the third 
requirement of a hegemonic leadership 
role. The key to capital export is capital 
to export. And once a world market in 35 
capital goods emerges, world surplus 
value can be mobilised only through 
trade. 
New York in the early 1920s became 
the great magnet for investment funds 
because of the tremendous expansion 
of its domestic markets. It thus became 
a great financial centre and combined 
functions of investing those funds in 
the US and channelling diem else-
where. But it had not unleashed its full 
productive might on world markets as 
the table shows. 
It could not mobilise and centralise 
the new value thrown onto world 
markets as Britain did in the mid-19th 
century. Britain attained its role as 
world banker first and foremost as the 
world's quartermaster. By 1918 it had 
lost this position; but no-one else had 
yet attained it. 
This is why the crash of 1929 af-
fected the USA worse, and for longer, 
than anyone else, and yet the recovery 
found it still forging ahead of its rivals. 
In the aftermath of a great credit crash 
it could neither mobilise idle loan capi-
tal for expansion, nor supply an export 
market created by the expansion of 
others. But the malaise lay not in its 
productive forces which, as Hoover 
never ceased explaining, were 'funda-
mentally healthy', but in its market 
situation in a world already carved up 
by the ancient European powers. 
Control of markets: the keystone of 
the arch 
This brings us to the fourth critical 
element of imperialist hegemony: the 
control of markets. Britain's unparal-
leled access to world markets was the 
crucial conquered asset with which it 
marched into the 20th century. It was 
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36 Share of exports of manufactured goods 
1899 1913 1929 1937 1950 1967 
US 
UK 
Germany 
11.7 
33.2 
22.4 
13.0 
30.2 
26.6 
20.4 
22.4 
20.S 
19.2 
20.9 
21.8 
26.6 
24.6 
7.0* 
20.6 
11.9 
19.7* 
the cement which bound together its 
role as producer, exporter and investor. 
In the heyday of empire there was 
no contradiction between domestic and 
foreign expansion. Britain organised 
the great centres of raw material and 
food production in the dominions with 
its railway and mining capital. Its ships 
carried the booty home where as 
monopsony purchaser it could dictate 
a purchase price well below world 
values, shoring up its exporters against 
foreign competition long after their 
time had come. And when challenged, 
the great Tyneside and Glasgow ships 
decked out their Woolwich guns and 
donned their Sheffield armour and 
steamed off to show the world the 
value of civilisation. 
When English gold met German 
steel and American power plants in the 
cities of Latin America, this unity 
began dissolving. As Britain lost its 
competitive edge in manufactured and 
capital goods, monopoly control of 
trade and finance became its decisive 
weapon in the battle for superprofit. 
One word expressed this monopoly -
empire. Two possessions embodied i t -
territory and ships. Britain dominated 
trade because it physically controlled 
both the means of world transport and 
the places it traded with. 
Its territorial role is well-known.9 
Readers may be less familiar with its 
control over trading routes, critical to 
its economic competition with the USA 
in the inter-war years. 
From 1870 to 1910 the UK success-
fully defended a share in world shipping 
tonnage never less than 34%, massively 
bolstered when in 1918 it confiscated 
the entire merchant marine of Ger-
many, its chief rival. In 1928 its gross 
tonnage was 20 million in a world total 
of 66 million, of which 16 million was 
owned by the USA. (Of this 3 million 
tonnes plied the Great Lakes and by 
1930 a further 3 million lay idle.) In 
1928 the UK produced 53% of the 
world's new gross tonnage.10 
On the critical trade routes Britain 
exercised a virtual total monopoly, in-
cluding not only the transport of its 
own goods (and of course, of its colo-
nies) but the international trade of its 
chief rivals. Again in 1928, die USA 
carried only 34% of its own trade with 
its two nearest neighbours, Mexico 
and Canada!11 
The significance of these mono-
polies for the UK as a world power are 
isolated with stark simplicity by the 
balance of payment figures for 1928. In 
this year a credit balance of $745m in 
1928 was produced from a debit of 
$1,795m on visible trade by two figures: 
$650m of 'net shipping income' and 
$ 1,425m of income from overseas in-
vestments. In blunt terms, Britain's 
trading advantage from superior tech-
nology had been supplanted by its 
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monopoly privileges arising directly 
from its control of markets and 
territories. 
In this lies the root of Britain's dis-
placement as hegemonic power and the 
key to understanding what a hegemonic 
power must consist of. 
The driving force of capitalist ex-
pansion is the search for superprofit; 
an above average profit which will per-
mit a capital to outgrow and eventually 
absorb its rivals. With the imperialist 
epoch two great sources of superprofit 
became the monopoly of a handful of 
great powers: monopoly rent arising 
from control of markets and credit; 
and technological superprofit arising 
from a monopoly control of an entire 
area of technology. 
The decisive requirement of a hege-
monic power is that it can guarantee 
the conditions for the general ascen-
dancy of the imperialist powers, pro-
viding them with a permanently ele-
vated share of the surplus value 
produced in the rest of the world. It 
must also, however, guarantee the dis-
tribution of this superprofit among die 
imperialist states such that all of diem 
enjoy a relative benefit from it, com-
pared to the bourgeoisies of the de-
pendent economies.12 But to do this it 
must command both main sources of 
superprofit. Simple domination of 
superior forces of production is not 
sufficient, as the USA found in die 
1920s and both Japan and Germany 
know today. Neither is simple domina-
tion of markets sufficient, akhough 
Britain still does not seem to under-
stand this and probably never will. 
From the great crisis of 1873 until 
the present day Britain has sacrificed 
its technological lead for its monopoly 
privileges, us capital was absolutely 
incapable of translating diis productive 
advantage into a stable realised surplus 37 
until it could supplant Britain as the 
principal organiser of the sources of 
monopoly rent - in short until it had 
become the world's foremost financial 
power and above all its foremost mili-
tary power. 
The great areas of us investment 
penetration provide a panoramic photo-
graph of the advancing new technolo-
gies of the first half of the 20th century, 
under the control and domination of 
the USA. In terms of the great capital 
commodities the batde between the US 
and the UK saw the triumph of air over 
sea, road over rail, electricity over steam 
and oil over coal.13 But a superior 
technology in and of itself was abso-
lutely insufficient. 
From 1929 the entire pattern of 
world trade shifted. In die absence of 
any stable trading medium the major 
imperialist countries retreated from 
triangular or multilateral trade and 
embarked on a series of bilateral or 
reciprocal arrangements. The decisive 
point about these is that they depend 
as much on the political relation of 
forces between the states concerned as 
on market relations between die 
countries. 
Britain not only ensured that an 
empire population of over 700 million 
traded with it to the exclusion of its 
rivals, but maintained a steady im-
provement of the terms of trade in its 
own favour. As it retreated into die 
laager of empire, its monopoly position 
became ever more an obstacle which 
the US could not surmount. At die 
lowest point of the depression, when 
US production stood at 53 relative to 
1929, British production had fallen to a 
mere 84. After Japan its recovery was 
the earliest, and its depression the shal-
lowest, of the capitalist world. 
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38 The following table shows how 
decisive Britain's military and political 
domination proved in die battle for 
markets. 
This is in sharp contrast with die 
situation of the us, which not only saw 
its access to world markets severely 
curtailed but also had to swallow die 
cancellation of most of die war debt. 
This determined die USA's foreign 
policy course: to break up die ancient 
empires under the banners of Free 
Trade and Liberal Values. The open-
ing shots of this policy were announced 
by Woodrow Wilson widi the famous 
'eight points' around which die League 
of Nations was constituted. The corner-
stone of Wilson's policy was die right 
of self-determination of all nations. To 
some this appeared an unnecessary con-
cession to Bolshevism but in fact it 
corresponded direcdy to die interests 
of US capital, which owned hardly any 
colonies and stood to gain everything 
from detaching everyone else's. 
Wilson, before his time, fell at the 
altar of isolationism. It was left to 
Roosevelt, together widi Stalin and 
Churchill, to redivide die world in 
1944 in a manner which exacdy cor-
responded to die relation of produc-
tive, military and financial forces. To 
the USSR, a buffer zone. To Britain, a 
junior partnership in us Limited, 
sanctified by a place in die sun and a 
share in atomic technology. To Ger-
many and Japan, us management. To 
France, whatever it could get. 
The arrangement precisely satisfies 
the conditions for hegemony which we 
established for Britain before wwi. The 
dollar replaced die pound as principal 
reserve currency and as die world's gold 
token, and die USA replaced Britain as 
the principal banker and policeman. 
The point which is often missed it diat 
all imperialist powers could share in 
the exploitation of die newly redivided 
colonial world because of die mechan-
isms for redistributing dus surplus in 
the multilateral trade of die metropolis. 
This includes powers such as Japan 
and Germany who were totally shorn 
of their empires. The USA's pent-up 
capital surplus poured into Europe and 
South East Asia to combine widi die 
burgeoning productive forces of die 
vanquished nations. 'Freed' of imperial 
obligations and expenditures, diey 
acquired die specialised role of ad-
vanced producers, securing technolo-
gical superprofit where monopoly rent 
was denied diem. 
Percentage of UK trade widi die empire14 
Imports 
Total (m) % from Empire 
Exports 
Total (m) %to Empire 
1913 
1924 
1931 
1933 
1935 
1937 
769 
1,277 
861 
675 
756 
1,028 
25.0 
26.4 
24.4 
34.2 
35.2 
37.4 
209 
305 
148 
150 
190 
238 
32.9 
32.4 
32.6 
35.9 
39.5 
39.9 
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1987 revisited 
It is now necessary to review the crash 
of 1987, and indeed economic develop-
ments since the break-up of Bretton 
Woods in 1971, in the light of diis 
analysis. 
Initially the USA very rapidly ex-
panded to become the world's leading 
military and territorial power. By 1960 
it had troops in 66 countries in the 
world.15 But in 1945 the basis of its 
position was without question its deci-
sive superiority in productive tech-
niques. It had 21.9% of all world 
exports of manufactures - but 56.7% 
of all value was added in die US.18 Since 
value added necessarily measures not 
just fresh labour but profit and surplus 
profit, this is a staggering ascendancy. 
In 1950 each US factory worker pro-
duced 3Vz times as much as her or his 
German counterpart and each miner 
four times as much.17 
Nevertheless the two central facts 
which emerge from any long-term 
study of trends in die post-war years 
are the exhaustion of die post-war 
wave of investment-led expansion and 
the decisive relative decline of the USA as 
producer and exporter from the early 1960s 
onwards. 
The roots of this relative decline lay 
in the very role acquired by Japan and 
Germany as the leading appropriators 
of technological rents. The USA steadily 
lost its productive advantage. 
Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison esti-
mate that between 1955 and 1970 capi-
tal stock per head grew by 38% in the 
US, 87% in Europe and 203% in Japan. 
Productivity in that period grew 6-7% 
faster in Japan than in the us and in 
Europe 4-5% faster. In the 1980s so far 
productivity has grown 4.2% per year 
in Europe, 5.6% in Japan and 1.6% in 
the us. 
This decline had to manifest itself 39 
in trade, and under Reagan it began to 
do so explosively. The gigantic US trade 
deficit is not the consequence of bad 
economic management, Reaganomics 
or any such superficial factors. It is the 
product of an inexorable, long-term 
and - if the inter-war years offer a basis 
for comparison - irreversible historical 
process, of the utmost importance to 
Marxists and socialists and, indeed, all 
humanity. 
This has expressed itself in virtually 
all sectors and all goods and was doing 
so long before the present crisis. To 
take just three representative sectors: 
Agriculture: In 1981, us farm ex-
ports at $44bn were 19% of all its ex-
ports. 30% of its farm produce was 
exported. The us agricultural surplus 
was so huge it used it as a major instru-
ment of political blackmail. In May, 
June and July of 1986 the US imported 
more agricultural goods than it ex-
ported. Its 1986 output at $26.5bn has 
fallen 40% in five years and its share of 
the world market from 59% to 41%. 
Capital Goods: By 1986 no less 
than half die USA's spending on capital 
equipment was imported.18 A surplus 
of $45bn on capital equipment has 
vanished in five years. Imports of 
machine tools rose from 25% of die US 
market to 43%.1S Between 1980 and 
1985 a quarter of all us machine-tool 
companies went out of business. 
Electronics: The 'hi-tech' trade gap 
with Japan reached $2bn in 1986 and 
has been the principal object of US 
restrictive trade legislation. An esti-
mated 70% of every computer shipped 
even by IBM is now manufactured in 
South East Asia. 
The consequences of this are, in a 
nutshell, precisely the same imbalance 
between the distribution of the forces of 
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40 production and the distribution of control 
over markets which dominated the inter-
war and depression years and led directly 
to World War II. 
There is, however, a major differ-
ence. In 1929 a clear alternative to 
British leadership existed. Now there 
is no such alternative. 
This impasse lies deep at the root of 
the 1987 crash, which arrived 7 years 
after the last slump with impeccable 
timing but was exacerbated by a com-
bination of two intractable circum-
stances: first, the rise of the US trade 
debt to the point where it could only be 
financed by completely reversing me 
post-war direction of capital flow so 
that the US began financing its deficit 
at the expense of its rivals; second, 
when it became clear that this appar-
ently limitless process amounted to a 
straight robbery of its financiers, who 
have now seen their dollar holdings fall 
to around half the value they held a 
year ago, and the said financiers denied 
they had had enough. 
The US has moved to exacdy die 
same position that Britain occupied in 
1918. It no longer guarantees die gen-
eral conditions for imperialist accumu-
lation but on die contrary destabilises 
them. It uses its accumulated financial 
and military weight to rob its rivals of 
the plunder of 'honest' trade. 
Is there a resolution to this process? 
The answer, of course, is that there is 
always a resolution under capitalism -
but at what price? A capitalist resolu-
tion, one can now insist not just with 
the benefit of theory but of terrible 
experience, necessarily involves a con-
vulsive, violent and destructive re-
organisation of the world's territories 
and markets. The imperialist world is 
becoming increasingly riven by its divi-
sion into rival trade blocs, with no 
power in position to unseat die USA, 
but all deriving increasing benefit from 
its leadership. It is only a quesdon of 
time before Japan and Europe begin to 
seek, with increasing aggression and 
audacity, the military and territorial 
clout needed to stabilise their industrial 
weight. Already, Franco-German mili-
tary collaboration and die growing 
nuclear arsenal of die European powers 
- untouched by the Gorbachev-Reagan 
accords - bear witness to the impera-
tives driving Western capital. 
If socialists owe themselves a pat on 
the back for predicting anodier 1929, 
they owe the entire world deliverance 
from another 1939. Santyana21 said diat 
those who do not learn from history are 
doomed to repeat it. This time round, 
his last three words are probably 
superfluous. 
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